The responses to the attacks illustrated the remarkable gulf in strategic culture between the two sides of the Atlantic. The US-declared a 'global war on terrorism' and directed the full resources of a 'national security' approach towards the threat posed by a 'new terrorism'. Overseas policy has been shaped by the identification of a nexus between international terrorism, weapons of mass destruction and 'states of concern'. At home the US has undertaken major changes to its governmental structure, tightened the sources of entry into the country, granted greater powers to its law enforcement officers and courts and overhauled its intelligence and security agencies. Meanwhile the Pentagon adopted a new strategic plan that emphasised non-military instruments and more co-operation with allies.
the use of force against the sources of terrorism to increasing internal security measures such as law enforcement and judicial action. 10 Nevertheless, the classical literature on counter-terrorism identifies, at least in outline, typologies of state-response to terrorism. Traditional ways of addressing terrorism might be grouped into three broad categories: first, military-led approaches focused on a mixture of pre-emption, deterrence or retribution; second, regulatory or legal-judicial responses that seek to enhance the criminal penalties for terrorist activities and improve civil/police co-operation; and third, appeasing options ranging from accommodation to concession. 11 The United States has evolved a sharply defined strategic culture. Its approach has been shaped by a belief in American exceptionalism, that its political and moral values are superior to those of the rest of the world and justify its position of leadership. This has given it a sense of mission in the world and a confidence that its actions are in the broadest interests of humanity.
12 This self-belief has been allied to strategies that seek ways to leverage its vast material and technological power. It has predisposed American policymakers toward a national security culture that privileges a military response. As a superpower, the US sees the use of force as an important signal of resolve within the international community. Its military gives the US a global reach and ensures that no targets are beyond its ability to strike. Since 9/11, increased American spending on defence (and especially defence research) relative to other major powers has accentuated this phenomenon.
Although the United States has been involved in counter-terrorism since the mid-1960s, it was only after the Iran hostages crisis of 1979 that this subject featured regularly on the presidential agenda. The US has consistently displayed an under-developed and somewhat two-dimensional counter-terrorism culture. In part this is because counterterrorism has been seen as an unattractive political issue. In the White House there was a fear of encouraging public expectations that could not be fulfilled and a tendency towards blame-avoidance. Meanwhile the US intelligence community was narrowly focused on the Cold War, playing to its strengths in technical collection, and relying on allied expertise for coverage of less important subjects. Terrorism was frequently perceived as something sponsored by the Soviet bloc and was regarded as a minor subset of the 'real problem'.
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American counter-terrorist operations have been adversely affected by a diet and binge approach to covert action and aggressive human intelligence collection. After the largesse of the first three decades of the Cold War, covert action became mired in the foreign policy struggles between the Congress and the White House during the 1970s. Special activities were shackled under President Carter and covert action appeared to be a dying art form. The Reagan era heralded the 'unleashing of the CIA' only for it to become bogged down once again in the Iran-Contra fiasco of 1986. 14 During the late 1980s covert action was rehabilitated partially by success in Afghanistan against the Soviets, only to meet a renewed downturn after the end of the Cold War. A risk-averse culture in the CIA was reinforced by a decision in the mid-1990s to drop agents that were either 'unsavoury' or politically risky. 15 Inevitably, 9/11 signalled a further swing of the pendulum. 16 The US experience of terrorism has been confined principally to its presence overseas.
Attacks upon its armed forces have been frequent and occasionally devastating, for example, the loss of 241 US Marines in Beirut in 1983. Yet it was not until the attack on the World Trade Centre in 1993 and the federal building in Oklahoma City in 1995 that the US experienced serious terrorism on its own shores. This absence of a sizeable domestic threat resulted in domestic counter-terror capacity being allowed to languish:
there was a feeling that the country was invulnerable. This misperception was cruelly exposed by the attacks of 9/11. The intensity of the US reaction to 9/11 was a reflection of the enormous loss of life and gave the US the political will to use force more readily on the international stage. Although the United States has long been perceived as 'trigger happy' in reality, prior to 9/11, all presidents -even Ronald Reagan -have agonised before taking action in the realm of counter-terrorism. 17 After 2001 the constraints that hitherto made America a 'reluctant sheriff' were stripped away and a new predisposition towards pre-emptive action was inaugurated.
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US strategic culture has also led to international terrorism being linked to a nexus of other threats. America's sense of its global responsibilities has meant that it has long been concerned with the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) and states that reject the prevailing order. Even prior to 9/11, the Clinton administration was warning of the potential linkages between international terrorist groups and 'states of concern'. 19 It was clear that the interaction between these issues were regarded by some as the foremost threat to American security. Once again, military power was perceived to be the principal instrument to address these challenges.
In contrast to the United States, a European strategic culture is more elusive. There is now some disagreement about the newness of the 'new terrorism' and four years after 9/11 the picture stands in need of reassessment. On the one hand, the rise of religious terrorism generally, since the early 1990s, and of terrorism by Islamicist groups in particular, is undeniable. A quarter of a million trained and radicalised Mujahadeen exiting from South Asia at the end of the war against the Soviets in Afghanistan has fuelled this development. They headed for their home countries, from the Mahgreb to Indonesia, or for new conflicts in Chechnya or Bosnia. Their organisation is more fissiparous than the old terrorism, an ideological community rather than a fixed hierarchy.
Al-Qaeda has tended to invest sporadic training and expertise in particular groups, rather than directing them. For many radical Islamicist groups, Osama bin Laden is an icon rather than leader. 
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Europe has been more sceptical of the idea of 'new terrorism', instead suggesting that the rise of Islamicist terrorism remains rooted in some old political and economic problems.
It has suited European attitudes to interpret this phenomenon more in terms of a reaction to specific policies and military deployments, rather than a general anathemising of the West. Gijs de Vries has pointed specifically to lack of progress on the Middle East peace process and in Iraq as key factors in terrorist recruitment. 28 Others have been inclined to talk about a situation in which there is not so much a new terrorism, but a new and more globalized environment which presents our enemies with enhanced opportunities. There is a globalised world in relation to communications, ideologies and capacity for violence.
Newness may be more about context, specifically the ability of social and religious movements to exploit opportunities provided by globalisation. In other words, developed states have encouraged a porous world in which networks move elegantly, but states move clumsily. The internet as the 'network of the networks' is a good example of this. 29 Certainly, the 'new terrorism' of 2001 does not look quite so innovative in retrospect.
There are likely to be few further 9/11s, but sadly more attacks similar to Bali, Madrid and London. Politicians on both sides of the Atlantic have been quick to seize on the rhetoric of 'new terrorism' because it mobilized elected assemblies, delivering enhanced budgets and robust packages of security legislation. However it has also provided a convenient excuse to forget awkward lessons expensively learned in past decades. Europeans have argued that in the rush to address the 'new terrorism', the United States in particular has neglected some of the basic conventions governing the related fields of counter-terrorism, counter-insurgency and intelligence. These concern the primacy of political warfare and minimum force, a doctrine that is greatly enhanced by good human intelligence. History, in almost any decade, underlines that few low intensity conflicts have been successfully resolved by a predominantly military approach, and never by applying large scale formal military power.
Contrasting Counter Terrorism Cultures Post 9/11
The different strategic cultures of the US and Europe have resulted in contending approaches to combating terrorism. In the realm of external security, the most striking difference has been in their preparedness to use force. As part of its integrated plan for countering terrorism, founded on the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, the US has accorded priority to its military and intelligence assets. The experience of 9/11 galvanised the US into a willingness to use its military power pre-emptively against a range of threats, in particular alleged state sponsors of terrorism and weapons of mass The significance accorded to multilateralism is the second major transatlantic difference.
Europe's experience of overcoming its own internal rivalries has led it to pursue policies The third difference has been European advocacy of long-term strategies aimed at conflict prevention. Overseas aid and poverty reduction have come to be perceived as instruments to remove some of the underlying causes of terrorism. Such funding can help to alleviate some of the factors that lead to the radicalisation of politics. This is also a sphere in which the EU can wield significant strength: it now disburses approximately 55% of the world's official development assistance. 33 In post-conflict situations, the Europeans have been willing to provide troops for protracted peace building projects, such as the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan, and they have provided the lion's share of resources to re-build functioning societies. The US, for its part, has tended to be more sceptical about the value of 'foreign policy as social work'. 34 The US, and particularly the Pentagon, has been wary of tying down large numbers of US the opportunities presented to it by the E3, thereby increasing the risk that the case will be referred to the UN Security Council. The White House has been persistent in it public saber-rattling towards Tehran. 36 However in August 2005 it was revealed that a major U.S. intelligence review had concluded that Iran is approximately a decade away from manufacturing the key ingredient for a nuclear weapon. This is twice the previous estimate, which had suggested a time period of five years. The sum of assessments by more than a dozen U.S. intelligence agencies directly contradict the dramatic statements by the White House and underline scope for diplomacy with Iran over its nuclear ambitions. 37 Internal security has also revealed some remarkable contrasts between Europe and
America. Both sides of the Atlantic believe in the importance of combating terrorism through law-enforcement, judicial and intelligence cooperation. The Europeans place more emphasis on these instruments because they do not accord the military instrument the prominence it is given by the Americans. The Europeans are also predisposed towards weighing the balance that is struck between more stringent security measures against terrorism and the penalties that are incurred in terms of human rights. They are more wary about investing law enforcement personnel with powers that could damage the core values of their society. 38 Nevertheless, the effort of the US in homeland security, since 9/11, should not be underestimated. 39 The National Strategy for Homeland Security has sought to construct a layered defence system. Overseas the US has relied upon its FBI legal attaches working in embassies and customs officials, deployed in European ports, monitoring the cargo destined for America. The next security circle concerns entry into US territory by foreigners and here the US has enhanced the security of airlines, introduced biometric identifiers into travel documents, reappraised its visa waiver programmes and tightened the types of crimes that comprise terrorism it also determined stiff penalties to be imposed for terrorist offences. 41 Furthermore, efforts to speed up the process of continent-wide extradition were achieved with the signing of a European Arrest Warrant (EAW). This designated thirty-two offences including terrorism, punishable by at least three years' duration, on which an arrest warrant could be invoked in one country and then carried out in the territory of another member. Commission still struggles to coordinate counter terrorism measures between the member states and the level of the Union. The EU has no internal security structure with the equivalent remit of the US Department of Homeland Security.
Convergence or Divergence in Transatlantic Counter Terrorism?
What are the prospects for transatlantic convergence on counter-terrorism? The practical business of everyday internal security cooperation and joint intelligence operations has continued in spite of transatlantic political storms. 42 Moreover, there has been no simple instruments can offer the main solution to countering terrorism. 57 He has instructed the Pentagon to join the State Department in emphasising the 'war of ideas'. The Pentagon has announced contracts amounting to $300 million awarded to companies that will work to enhance its psychological operations. 58 Have there been corresponding changes in Europe? Restored confidence in transatlantic approaches will certainly require a change of attitude on both sides. In December 2003, the European Council published a 'European Security Strategy' (ESS) that attempted to concert policy amongst the EU member states. 59 . There was some evidence in the European Security Strategy that EU states have moved closer to American thinking on security threats by acknowledging that terrorist acquisition of WMD was a priority consideration and that Europe would have to play a bigger part in addressing security challenges outside of its region. Too often in the past European countries left matters such as nuclear proliferation to the US. In the earliest draft of the paper, reference was made to the possibility of military pre-emption, thereby narrowing the gap with US thinking, but in the final draft this was diluted to talk of 'preventive engagement'.
Furthermore, the ESS remained wedded to UN approval for military interventions which remained at odds with the US. is hard to see where the personnel will come from for sophisticated political operations.
In short, it is clear that the United States has changed its mind, but they are unsure whether the United States is capable of, or indeed has the capacity for, a change of heart.
There are also sceptics in Washington. Few believe that the White House can persuade the many agencies and departments to work more closely together. The new strategies have been long in the making for the very reason that Washington has been unable to resolve awkward debates over whether Iraq is making more terrorists and whether the United States needs to change its policy towards the Palestinian-Israeli dispute. Some observe that resolving to sell existing policies in the region better is an easier bureaucratic option than changing them. Tenet warned the Senate intelligence committee that globalisation, which had been the driving force behind the expansion of the world economy, had simultaneously become a serious threat to US security. 62 The problem was not so much a new enemy, but a new medium. A globalized world favours insurgents groups and puts developed states at a disadvantage. The greatest challenge for both European and American strategic thinking may be that a range of transnational threats are accelerated by globalisation. The uncomfortable truth is that while 'globalization works', it works best for Al-Qaeda and its admirers. 63 Nevertheless, the EU and the US must redouble their efforts to arrive at common perceptions of threats and responses in relation to countering international terrorism.
They are two international actors that have a history of the closest cooperation and only if they act together can this persistent and growing menace be addressed effectively. If they fail to work together, if their strategic cultures cause them to continue to diverge, then the prospects for the West's ability to address one of the most important issues on its security agenda are bleak. 
